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Case No. 20050705-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Should this Court reach defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
defense of habitation instruction where defendant invited any error? 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's claim challenging the trial court's 
limitation on her cross-examination of the victim where the record is 
inadequate to address her claim? 
No standard of review applies to these unpreserved issues. 
STATUTES AND RULE 
The following statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second degree felony, for 
shooting Jason Grant, a family friend, and aggravated assault, a third degree felony 
for pointing a gun at D.J. McEntire, her husband (R. 2-3). After a two-day jury trial, 
defendant was convicted on the first charge; she was acquitted on the second (R. 131-32). 
At her sentencing hearing, held August 1, 2005, defendant received a suspended 
sentence of one-to-fifteen years in prison (R. 143-46; 191-94). She was then placed on 
three years' probation and ordered to serve 120 days in jail (R. 143-46; 191-94). 
Defendant filed her notice of appeal on the same day as her sentencing hearing (R. 
170-71). Simultaneously, defendant filed a motion for certificate of probable cause, 
requesting that her sentence be stayed pending her appeal (R. 172-73). The trial court 
granted defendant's motion (R. 184-85). The trial court entered its final judgment on 
October 12, 2005 (R. 191-94). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On May 31, 2004, defendant returned to her family cabin after an argument with 
her husband to find her friend Ryan Grant and his brother Jason "standing up and . . . 
pushing against each other" (Tr2:271). Defendant did not see any blood or obvious 
injuries on the brothers (Tr2:299, 305). Nor did she see either throw a punch (Tr2:302, 
305). In fact, she did not even know which brother "had the upper hand at that moment" 
(Tr2:300-01). Notwithstanding, defendant cocked her gun, pointed it at Jason, and fired 
(Tr2:273). 
Defendant and her husband, D.J., had been married almost eight years by the 
spring of 2004 (Tr2:234). Soon after their first child, D.J. started to physically abuse 
defendant (Tr2:235). The abuse continued for about three years (Tr2:236). D.J. then 
began taking Prozac, and "we had my second child and we had a great family" for about 
four years (Tr2:236-37). 
In the spring of 2004, however, defendant got sick, and D.J. had to take over more 
of the children's care (Tr2:237). About the same time, D.J. started a new job that 
involved a lot of traveling (Id). D.J. "got overwhelmed and started using 
!The facts are related in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^  2, 82 P.3d 1106. 
3 
[methamphetamine] to stay awake and keep his energy up and take care of everything" 
(Trl:211-12;Tr2:237). 
Within a month, DJ. "started turning into a different person" (Tr2:238). He began 
staying up all night and became "irritated," "agitated," "paranoid," and "controlling" 
(Tr2:238-39). Soon, DJ. started verbally and physically abusing defendant again 
(Tr2:238). About that same time, defendant told D J. she was beginning to have feelings 
for a childhood friend, Ryan Grant, who was also D J.'s main drug dealer (Tr2:222, 239-
41). DJ. "started getting more and more jealous" (Tr2:241).2 
Notwithstanding, the couple planned a Memorial Day vacation with friends at 
defendant's family cabin in an isolated part of Duchesne County (Trl: 108-09; Tr2:242). 
However, defendant "didn't want to be embarrassed [by] [her husband's] behavior" 
(Tr2:242). Thus, when things got tense on the day they were to leave, defendant left their 
home by herself, on foot, to get away from DJ. (Trl:212; Tr2:242-43). Although DJ. 
followed her in their car and tried to get her to return home, defendant refused (Trl :212-
13; Tr2:243). Instead, when a family friend, Jesse Knight, pulled up, she jumped into his 
car and asked him to drive her to the cabin (Tr2:243-44). Jesse agreed, and the two 
arrived at the cabin about dusk the day before the shooting (Tr2:244). 
2At trial, defendant testified that, although she initially denied it when asked by 
police, she was in fact having an affair with Ryan (Tr2:278-80). Ryan testified that, 
although he initially told police that the two were having an affair, in fact they were not 
(Trl:152, 161; Tr2:319). 
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Later that night, defendant and Jesse were joined by Ryan Grant (Tr2:245). 
Defendant had known Ryan "[s]ince [she] was very young" (Trl: 112; Tr2:239). They 
had gone to school together, their families knew each other, and she'd "been friends with 
him He went to all my birthday parties, things like that" (Trl: 112; Tr2:239-40). 
More recently, Ryan worked with defendant's "father-in-law . . . and was helping out on 
the ranch with [defendant's] horse and stuff like that" (Tr2:240). 
Ryan had been at defendant's house earlier that day working on his truck, and had 
heard defendant and DJ. arguing (Trl: 111, 113, 150; Tr2:246). After finishing with his 
truck, Ryan got gas and headed up to the cabin "to ride the fence lines for [defendant's] 
Mom," i.e., "to check the fence lines to see if they were okay for her cows to be moved 
into" (Trl: 112-13; Tr2:246). Ryan arrived at the cabin with his horses, his saddle, his 
equipment, and a pistol (Trl: 112-13). Ryan brought the pistol because "I always carry a 
gun with me when I'm riding my horse, in the wild . . . , for security reasons" (Trl: 113). 
Ryan took the saddle, equipment, and gun inside the cabin, and put them next to the chair 
in the living room (Trl: 116) 
That night, defendant slept in the bedroom; Jesse slept on a chair; Ryan slept on 
the couch (Trl:117; Tr2:245). The next day, Jesse left (Trl:l 18-19). 
Over the course of the day, D.J. and defendant called each other some 20 times on 
the telephone (Tr2:252). Defendant initially told D.J. that she would "come straight 
home" once he got some sleep (Id.). Eventually, however, D.J. started threatening 
5 
defendant, especially when he learned that Ryan was at the cabin with her (Trl :214; 
Tr2:252-53). Although DJ. did not then have a vehicle, DJ. "said he was going to try to 
find a way up there, try to find a truck" (Tr2:254). According to defendant, D J. "seemed 
crazy"; "I thought I was dead at that point" (Tr2:253-54). 
A short while later, Jason Grant, Ryan's brother, got a phone call from his mother, 
telling him that D J. was looking for a ride up to the cabin (Trl: 173, 197). Jason called 
D J. to see what he wanted (Trl: 174). D J. told him that defendant and Ryan were at the 
cabin, and he wanted to find out what was going on between them, so he wanted a ride up 
there (Trl: 174, 198). Although Jason's parents asked him not to, Jason gave D J. a ride 
(Tr 1:174, 197). On the way up, D J. explained why he thought something was going on 
between defendant and Ryan (Trl: 185). 
Ryan and defendant heard Jason's truck when it approached the cabin (Trl: 119). 
Ryan recognized the sound of the truck, and was pretty sure it was his brother's (Id). 
Jason parked the truck right in front of the cabin, next to the door (Trl: 120, 193). 
Then, he remained in the truck while DJ. went in (Trl: 120, 198). As DJ. arrived at the 
door, he heard defendant lock it (Trl: 198; Tr2:256). DJ. "kicked the door in and walked 
inside" (Trl: 120, 151, 198; Tr2:256-57). 
Once inside, however, D J. did not hit defendant, nor was he "yelling or coming 
across as being violent"(Trl:151, 203, 209, 215; Tr2:258, 291, 324). Rather, DJ. only 
took defendant by the arm and led her into the bedroom (Tr2:291). There, D J. told 
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defendant to collect her things because they were going home (Trl :209; Tr2:257). 
Defendant was afraid to leave with D.J.; "I knew I would get hurt" (Tr2:261). 
D. J. then started "just look[ing] around" and trying to get defendant to talk with 
him (Trl:203, 209-10). At that point, the two were "kind of arguing" (Tr2:261). Ryan 
decided that defendant and D. J. needed some time to talk, so Ryan went out to the truck 
to see Jason (Trl: 120, 152, 175, 203, 215; Tr2:258, 341). 
Within a few minutes, D.J. noticed Ryan's gun next to the chair (Trl :203; 
Tr2:258). Defendant, noticing that D.J. had espied the gun, jumped for and grabbed it 
(Trl :203; Tr2:259, 262). Defendant pointed the gun at D.J. and "said get away from me" 
(Tr2:259, 262). Defendant then ran out of the cabin, down a slope toward a nearby pond, 
and crouched behind some bushes (Trl:203, 205-06; Tr2:263, 266). Although defendant 
was afraid that D.J. might follow her, D.J. did not (Tr2:266). 
Meanwhile, hearing the commotion inside, Ryan re-entered the cabin (Trl: 120, 
153, 203). Jason soon followed and, while DJ. looked through the cabin, the brothers 
stayed in the living room and talked (Trl: 120, 175, 192-93, 203-04). Jason, who thought 
Ryan was having an affair with defendant, voiced his disappointment (Trl: 120-21, 175, 
184-85). The two then "exchanged some words" and started to wrestle (Trl: 121, 176, 
204). As they did so, they banged into some of the furniture but did not break anything 
(Trl: 122). As Ryan described it, their battle was just "like a pushin, wrestlin' match" 
(Trl:122, 177). "This [wa]sn't a fist fight. There's a difference" (Trl: 187). 
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D.J. stood back and watched the brothers for a minute, and then tried to break the 
two of them up (Trl: 123, 127). "[T]hat's when we stood up and the fight was over by 
then" (Trl: 123, 178). The brothers were "push[ing] up against each other, up against the 
corner of the wall," but, at that point, they "were just kind of standing and talking" 
(Trl:123, 127, 154, 178, 187). "That's when [defendant] came in" (Trl: 125, 178) 
According to Ryan, "there was time enough if somebody came in[to] that scenario 
to understand there's no danger here, nobody is fighting, everything is cool" (Trl: 155). 
Thus, "[tjhere was no reason for anybody to have to got shot" (Trl: 130). Nonetheless, 
Jason testified, defendant "came in and she didn't even hesitate" (Trl: 178-79, 184). Even 
as "[ejverybody was screaming at that time don't shoot," defendant cocked the gun, 
pointed it at Jason, and fired, hitting him in the hip (Trl: 125, 130, 155, 179, 184). 
Defendant then briefly pointed the gun at her husband, D.J., before dropping it and 
running to the bathroom (Trl :219). 
Almost immediately, defendant screamed for someone to call the police (Trl: 125). 
But, no one wanted to get the police involved (Trl: 139). Thus, instead, D.J. drove Jason 
to Jason's home, and Ryan drove defendant (Trl: 126). When Jason's wife became upset 
over the incident, Ryan and defendant decided to return to the cabin (Id). D.J. drove 
Jason to the hospital (Id.). 
The defense. At trial, defendant admitted that she had twice pointed Ryan's gun at 
D.J. during the incident at the cabin (Tr2:307). According to defendant, however, she had 
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recently told D. J. about her feelings for Ryan, and, during their earlier telephone 
conversations, D.J. had threatened to kill both her and Ryan (Trl:202, 214-15; Tr2:253, 
270-71). Thus, defendant testified, each time she pointed the gun at her husband, she did 
so because, based on his recent conduct and the threats he had made to her over the 
telephone, she was afraid of him (Tr2:306-07). 
Defendant also admitted shooting Jason and causing serious bodily injury (Trl:8; 
Tr2:273). According to defendant, she did so only to "sav[e] [her and Ryan's] lives" 
(Tr2:284). Defendant claimed that, after she had left the cabin with the gun, she heard 
"yelling and screaming" and "could hear the furniture" (Tr2:267). She thus started 
creeping back up to the cabin (Id). 
On the way, defendant "could see through the window" and "saw two people go 
down and it looked like D.J. was kicking" (Id.). Although she could not see what was 
actually happening on the cabin floor, she remembered that D.J. had threatened to kill 
Ryan, and she was afraid that D.J. and Jason were attacking him (Tr2:270-71, 312-13). 
She then started running back to the cabin (Tr2:268). 
When she reached the stairs, defendant could no longer see into the window 
(Tr2:269). However, according to her testimony, she still heard the "furniture moving" 
and "yelling," although she could not hear what anyone was saying (Tr2:269-70). 
According to defendant, "[t]here was a fight,... an obvious struggle inside," and she 
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heard angry voices (Tr2:270). Thus, when she got to the porch, she fired a warning shot 
to try and stop the fight (Tr2:269-70). 
She then "r[a]n through the door," "h[e]ld the gun," and "sa[id] leave [Ryan] 
alone" (Tr2:271). At that point, defendant saw DJ. was by the couch, no longer involved 
in the altercation {Id.). And, she saw Ryan and Jason "standing up and they're pushing 
against each other and Jason is kind of against the wall but they're like this, you know, in 
arms" (Id). 
Defendant admitted that she did not see any blood when she re-entered the cabin 
(Tr2:299, 305). Nor did she see any serious cuts (Tr2:299-300). Nor did she hear anyone 
"crying in pain with a broken limb" (Tr2:300). Nor did she see any punches being thrown 
(Tr2:305). Nor did she see any furniture being broken (Tr2:304). 
Rather, all she saw was Jason and Ryan "in arms fighting like a struggle," with 
each "bracing and pushing against each other" (Tr2:300-01, 316). According to 
defendant, Ryan then yelled, "shoot him, like bloody murder shoot him, you know" 
(Tr2:272).3 
Prosecutor: So basically what you came upon was a scuffle? 
3According to Ryan, when defendant came into the cabin pointing the gun, 
"[ejverybody was screaming at that time don't shoot" (Trl:130, 155). However, "I think 
that everybody was quiet as my last words came out and the last thing she heard from me 
was shoot" (Trl:130). Still, Ryan testified, "there was time enough if somebody came in 
[] that scenario to understand there's no danger here, nobody is fighting, everything is 
cool" (Trl: 155). 
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Defendant: Yes. 
Prosecutor: So you didn't look to determine who had the upper hand at that 
moment? 
Defendant: No. 
Prosecutor: You just took your weapon, cocked it, aimed it— 
Defendant: When Ryan yelled shoot him— 
Prosecutor: —and fired. 
Defendant: —I trusted what he said at the time. 
(Tr2:300-301). 
According to defendant, she never had any ill feelings toward Jason, nor did she 
ever want to hurt him (Tr2:283). However, she was afraid for her own and Ryan's safety 
(Tr2:272). "[H]e just yelled shoot him and I pointed down and shot" (Tr2:273). "I felt 
like I was saving our lives" (Tr2:284). 
Defendant cooperated when police arrived at the cabin later that night (Tr2:276-
278). But, unlike her testimony at trial, she never told the police that she was having an 
affair with Ryan (Tr2:278-79). Defendant explained at trial that she wanted to spare her 
family the humiliation, and that she was afraid of how D.J. would react (Tr2:279). 
Moreover, Ryan had asked her not to say anything (Tr2:282). 
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Nor did defendant tell the police anything about Ryan telling her to shoot 
(Tr2:278). According to defendant, Ryan told her not to say anything, and she "was 
trying to protect Ryan" (Tr2:282). 
Closing arguments. At the close of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on 
the following defenses: self-defense, defense of others, and defense of habitation (R. 118-
22; Jury Instrs. 16-19 (attached at Addendum B)). In closing argument, defense counsel 
argued that defendant was innocent of aggravated assault against her husband because she 
was acting in self-defense (Tr2:386-88, 399-401). Defense counsel argued that defendant 
was innocent of aggravated assault against Jason Grant because she was acting in defense 
of Ryan and in defense of habitation (Tr2:394-96, 401-05). 
The verdicts. Defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault against her husband 
(R, 132). She was convicted of aggravated assault against Jason Grant (R. 131). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it gave a jury instruction 
on defense of habitation that deviated from the statutory language defining that defense. 
Defendant's only comment during discussion of the instruction, however, indicated that 
she had no objection to it. Thus, defendant led the trial court into any error, and this 
Court should not reach her claim. 
In any case, defendant's claim fails because, even if the instruction were 
erroneous, she was not prejudiced by the instruction. At best, a defense of habitation 
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defense was applicable to the charge involving her husband, who had previously 
threatened her and Ryan and had recently broken into her cabin. The defense was not 
applicable to the charge involving Jason, who had not previously threatened anyone, had 
not entered into defendant's cabin in any unlawful or forceful manner, and was merely 
involved in a tussle with his brother when defendant shot him. Moreover, in rejecting 
defendant's defense of another claim, the jury obviously found that defendant's use of 
deadly force against Jason was not reasonable. That finding foreclosed not only 
defendant's defense of another claim but also her defense of habitation claim, particularly 
where both defenses rested on defendant's claim that she shot Jason in defense of Ryan. 
Point II. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not allow her to 
cross-examine Jason Grant "regarding his favorable treatment by the state and the terms 
of his child abuse plea in abeyance agreement." Nothing in the record substantiates 
defendant's contention that Jason was facing any charges at the time of trial, let alone that 
he had received favorable treatment from the State on them. The record is therefore 
inadequate to reach defendant's claim. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION 
WHERE DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it gave a defense of habitation jury 
instruction that allowed the jury to consider factors not included in the statutory definition 
13 
of the defense. See Aplt. Br. at 15. Because the record indicates that defendant led the 
trial court into any error concerning the instruction, this Court should not reach her claim. 
A, Proceedings below. 
The record on appeal does not contain copies of defendant's proposed jury 
instructions. Thus, the record contains no indication of the language proposed in 
defendant's defense of habitation instruction. 
Before trial, however, the trial court referenced defendant's proposed instructions, 
noting that it had looked at them, and "I can see there's going to be some disagreement on 
the self-defense concepts but let's put those on the shelf right now and let's work on those 
[later]" (Tr 1:7). 
At the close of evidence, the trial court and parties met off the record to discuss 
jury instructions. At the close of that discussion, the court allowed the parties to place 
any objections on the record: 
Court: . . . The Court and counsel are in chambers. We have been 
working on jury instructions. We have spent a lot of time 
trying to craft an instruction on defense of habitation. There 
have been, the defense of habitation, the Court didn't really 
feel like it applied or was too strong, so we added some 
modifying language and the Court decided to give it as crafted 
and I guess [prosecutor]? 
Pros: Yes, I still object to it. I think it doesn't constitute the elements of 
defense of habitation in this case. 
Court: Okay. The rest of the instructions have been given to the scribe for 
retyping and will be given in the order the Court has already done it 
and that's our record. 
14 
Def. Co: That's correct. 
Court: Okay. 
(Tr2:344-45). Unlike the prosecutor, defendant never expressed any objection to the 
defense of habitation instruction. 
After trial, defendant did not file a motion for new trial challenging the trial court's 
defense of habitation instruction. Rather, after filing her notice of appeal, defendant filed 
a motion for certificate of probable cause, asking that the trial court stay her sentence 
pending her appeal. As a basis for her motion, defendant challenged the defense of 
habitation instruction (R. 180). According to defendant, "although counsel acceded to the 
language, it was only after the court made it clear that without the language, the 
instruction would not be given at all" (Id). 
The trial court held two hearings on defendant's certificate of probable cause 
motion (R. 177-78, 184-85). Defendant has not included transcripts of those hearings in 
the record on appeal. 
B. Defendant's challenge to the defense of habitation instruction fails 
because she invited any error. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's defense of habitation instruction was 
erroneous because it "allow[ed] the jury to consider other factors not in the [statutory 
definition of the defense]" but "did not give the jury any guidance as to how to access the 
factors." Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant claims that, where "the sole theory of the defense 
was that [defendant] was justified in her shooting of Jason Grant as she was protecting 
15 
Ryan and her cabin after the forced entry for unlawful purposes," id. at 16, "the modified 
instruction so changed the burden of proof and confused the jury as to the elements of her 
defense of habitation that it caused reversible error." Id. at 22.4 
Defendant asserts that she objected to the trial court's instruction off the record. 
See Aplt. Br. at 17. Alternatively, she argues that, "in the event the State on appeal 
believes the objection was not preserved on the record or was insufficient, appellate 
4Utah's defense of habitation defense is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 
(West 2004), as follows: 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he [or she] reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate another's unlawful entry into or attack upon his [or her] 
habitation; however, he [or she] is justified in the use of force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he [or she] reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he [or she] reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for 
the purpose of committing a felony in the habitation or that the force is necessary 
to prevent the commission of a felony. 
(2) The person using force of deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed for 
the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably [,] and had a 
reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or 
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force, or in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose 
of committing a felony. 
The trial court's defense of habitation instruction recited the statutory definition set forth 
above. However, it then added the following paragraph: 
You may consider, but are not limited to the following factors in the above: 
1. Length of time between the entry and the shooting. 
2. The fact that the defendant left the cabin and chose to return. 
(R. 120). 
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counsel asserts that the trial Court's action of adding in the language was plain error." 
Aplt. Br. at 18. This Court should not reach defendant's claim because she invited any 
error. In any case, defendant cannot show that she was prejudiced by the trial court's 
instruction, even if erroneous. 
1, Applicable law. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 19(e) addresses challenges to written jury 
instructions. Rule 19(e) provides: 
Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury. . . . Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an 
instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest 
injustice. In stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the 
objection is made and the ground of the objection. 
Thus, under the rule, a party objecting to a written jury instruction must raise her 
objection "before the instructions are given to the jury" and must specifically "identify the 
matter to which the objection is made and the ground of the objection." Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(e). If a party does not raise such an objection, "the instruction may not be assigned as 
error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Id. 
Not every unpreserved claim is reachable under this provision. Rather, for an 
appellate court "[t]o review an instruction under the manifest injustice exception, counsel 
must have failed to object to the instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, <[ 54, 70 
P.3d 111. "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be assigned as error even if such 
instruction constitutes manifest injustice ' if counsel, either by statement or act, 
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affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction.'" State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742 (quoting Hamilton, 
2003 UT 22, | 54); see also State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 62, 114 P.3d 551. "This 
prevents a party from tak[ing] advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error." Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
2. The record does not support defendant's contention that she 
objected to the trial court's instruction; thus, this Court may 
review her claim, if at all, only for manifest injustice. 
Defendant claims that she objected to the trial court's instruction during an off-the-
record discussion in chambers. See Aplt. Br. at 17. The record does not support 
defendant's contention. 
A defendant who wishes to preserve a claim first raised in an off-the-record 
discussion "[is] obliged to make an objection on the record." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 
86, J^ 33 & n.l 1, 55 P.3d 573 (rejecting contention that defendant preserved claim in off-
the-record conference where defendant never made objection on the record); see also id. 
("[I]t [is] the responsibility of the parties, not the trial court, to ensure than any objections 
were preserved in the record."). '"One who fails to make a necessary objection or who 
fails to insure that it is on the record is deemed to have waived the issue.'" State v. 
Smedley, 2003 UT App 79, \ 10, 67 P.3d 1005 (quoting State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 537 
(Utah App. 1998)); State v. Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, f 12, 63 P.3d 110 (same). 
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In this case, nothing in the record at trial indicates that defendant objected to the 
trial court's defense of habitation instruction. In fact, when the trial court gave the parties 
an opportunity to place any objections to jury instructions on the record after the off-the-
record discussion, only the prosecutor objected to the defense of habitation instruction 
(Tr2:344-45). When the trial court then stated, "that's our record," defense counsel 
stated, "[t]hat's correct," affirmatively indicating to the trial court that he had no 
objection to any jury instruction, let alone the defense of habitation one (Tr2:345). See 
Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ffl[ 33-34 (holding that defendant did not preserve objection where 
he "did not join in [co-defendant's] objections on the record or make any objection of his 
own"). 
Perhaps for this reason, defendant does not cite the trial record to support her 
contention that she objected to the trial court's instruction. Rather, she cites to her own 
post-trial description of the unrecorded jury instruction discussion. See Aplt. Br. at 17 
(quoting R:180 (defendant's Memorandum i[n] Support of Motion for Certificate of 
Probable Cause)). According to defendant's motion for a certificate of probable cause, 
during the off-the-record discussion, the State "'objected to the instruction, and after 
much discussion, the court indicated that it would not give the instruction at all unless 
language was added to allow the jury to consider other factors not in the code . . . . 
[Ajlthough [defense] counsel acceded to the language, it was only after the court made it 
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clear that without the language, the instruction would not be given at all.5" Id. (quoting R. 
180). 
Defendant's post-trial statements, however, are inadequate to establish her 
objection. As this Court has held, "'[cjounsel's recollection of the course of proceedings 
is no substitute for a record of those proceedings.'5' Davis, 965 P.2d at 537 (quoting 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 1991)) (additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a defendant raises an objection at 
trial "and that objection fail[s] to appear of record, the appropriate course of action [i]s to 
seek to supplement the record via Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h)," which 
"'provides a reliable method for the reconstruction of events when the record has failed in 
some limited respect.'" Id. (quoting Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359). 
Defendant did not follow that procedure here. Thus, no record supports her claim 
that she timely objected to the trial court's defense of habitation instruction. Absent such 
a record, this Court must assume that defendant did not object. See State v. Harper, 2006 
UT App 178, TJ 21, 136 P.3d 1261 ("'"When a defendant predicates error to this [cjourt, 
he has the duty and responsibility to support such allegation by an adequate record.'"") 
(quoting State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 
657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982))).5 
defendant's own post-trial characterization of the off-the-record discussion 
reveals the soundness of this rule. Nowhere in that characterization does defendant 
actually state that she objected to the instruction she now challenges—only that counsel 
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Consequently, the trial court's defense of habitation instruction, if reviewable at 
all, may be reviewed only for manifest injustice. See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
3. This Court should not review the trial court's instruction for 
manifest injustice because defendant affirmatively led the trial 
court into any error. 
Defendant asserts that "in the event the State on appeal believes the objection was 
not preserved on the record or was insufficient, appellate counsel asserts that the trial 
Court's actions of adding in the language was plain error." Aplt. Br. at 18. Because 
defendant invited any error, this Court should not reach her claim. 
As previously stated, under rule 19(e), "[ujnless a party objects to an instruction 
. . . , the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." It 
is now well-settled, however, that review for manifest injustice is not available where 
"'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she 
had no objection to the jury instruction.'" Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^  9 (quoting 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^  54); see also Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 62. 
In this case, the trial court and counsel discussed jury instructions in an off-the-
record conference. After that conference, the trial court allowed both parties to make a 
"acceded to the [instruction] . . . after the court made it clear that without the language, 
the instruction would not be given at all" (R. 180). Absent a rule 11(h) proceeding, we 
have no idea what the trial court actually said during the jury instruction discussion. Nor 
do we have any idea whether defendant actually objected to the court's instruction, 
objected on the basis now raised, or merely "acceded" to the instruction without ever 
voicing her concerns. 
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record of any objections to the instructions the court intended to give (Tr2:344). At that 
time, the State objected to the trial court's defense of habitation instruction (Tr2:344-45). 
Defense counsel, however, did not (Id.). Instead, defense counsel "'affirmatively 
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction,'" 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \ 9 (quoting Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 54). Specifically, when 
the trial court indicated, "that's our record," defense counsel stated, "[t]hat's correct" 
(Tr2:345). The clear implication of defense counsel's conduct—silence when the 
prosecutor voiced her objection followed by a statement indicating that he had no 
objections to register—was that he did not object to any of the jury instructions, including 
the defense of habitation instruction one. By "affirmatively representing] to the court 
that he . . . had no objection to the jury instruction," Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 54, defense 
counsel invited any error. The defense of habitation instruction, therefore, "may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice." Geukgeuzian, 
2004 UT 16, Tf9. 
Consequently, this Court should not reach defendant's claim. 
C. Even on its merits, defendant's claim fails because she was not 
prejudiced by the trial court's instruction, even if it was erroneous. 
Even if this Court were to find no invited error, the instruction is reviewable only 
for manifest injustice because there is no record of any objection. Because review for 
manifest injustice is essentially equivalent to review for plain error, defendant must show 
(1) that the trial court's instruction was erroneous, (2) that the error should have been 
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obvious to the trial court, and (3) that the error was prejudicial. See State v. Powell, 2007 
UT 9, fflf 17-18, P.3d . A jury instruction, even if erroneous, is only prejudicial 
"if [it] tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently 
or erroneously advises the jury on the law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 17, 
17 P.3d 1153 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant claims that the trial court's defense of habitation instruction was 
erroneous because it "allow[ed] the jury to consider other factors not in the [statutory 
definition of the defense]" but "did not give the jury any guidance as to how to access the 
factors." Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant claims that, where "the sole theory of the defense 
was that [defendant] was justified in her shooting of Jason Grant as she was protecting 
Ryan and her cabin after the forced entry for unlawful purposes," id. at 16, "the modified 
instruction so changed the burden of proof and confused the jury as to the elements of her 
defense of habitation that it caused reversible error." Id. at 22. Defendant's claim fails 
because she was not prejudiced by the trial court's instruction, even if obviously 
erroneous. 
1. The instruction. 
Jury Instruction 17 contained the trial court's defense of habitation instruction. 
Jury Instruction 17 read as follows: 
You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such 
force is necessary to prevent or terminate another's unlawful entry into or attack 
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upon his or her habitation; however, he or she is justified in the use of force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
a. the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he or she reasonably believes that 
the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or 
offering personal violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the 
habitation and he or she reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; or 
b. he or she reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for 
the purpose of committing a felony in the habitation or that the force 
is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony. 
The person using force of deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed 
for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably, and had a 
reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or 
attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of force, or in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose 
of committing a felony. 
You may consider, but are not limited to the following factors in the above: 
1. Length of time between the entry and the shooting. 
2. The fact that the defendant left the cabin and chose to return. 
(R. 120). 
2. Defendant's challenge fails because she was not prejudiced by 
the instruction, even if it was erroneous. 
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's defense of habitation instruction fails 
because, even if the instruction was erroneous, defendant was not prejudiced it. 
First, to the extent defense of habitation was even applicable to the charges 
defendant faced, it was at best applicable only to the charge involving her husband. It 
was D.J., after all, who had unlawfully entered defendant's cabin by force after 
threatening her earlier over the telephone. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405. Defendant, 
however, did not shoot D.J. Rather, she shot Jason Grant, who had neither unlawfully 
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entered defendant's cabin "in a violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by 
stealth," nor entered with an intent to "assaultf] or offer[] personal violence to any person, 
dwelling, or being in the habitation." Id. 
Second, even if the jury considered the defense relative to defendant's shooting 
Jason, the defense was at best co-extensive to the other defense asserted by defendant: the 
defense of another. In other words, even if defendant could have somehow convinced the 
jury that Jason had entered defendant's cabin unlawfully "in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth," she still had to convince the jury that "she 
reasonably believe[d] that [deadly] force [wa]s necessary to prevent [an] assault or offer 
of personal violence," Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405(l)(a)—essentially the same thing she 
had to show to prevail on her defense of another claim, see R. 118 (Jury Instr. 16 ("You 
are instructed that a person is justified in threatening or using deadly force against another 
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of deadly unlawful 
force.")); see also R. 122 (Jury Instr. 19 (listing factors jury may consider in determining 
whether defendant was reasonable in believing that she was justified in using deadly 
force; by its language, explaining reasonableness standard for both defense of habitation 
and defense of another)). 
The jury rejected the defense of another claim. Thus, it necessarily found that 
defendant was not justified in using deadly force to protect Ryan from his brother. 
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Almost certainly, if it did not reject the defense of habitation defense outright, the jury 
rejected that defense for the same reason. The trial court's additional language, therefore, 
had no effect upon the jury's verdict. 
Consequently, even if this Court were to reach the merits of defendant's claim, the 
claim fails. 
II. THIS COURT CANNOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION ON HER CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF JASON GRANT BECAUSE THE RECORD IS 
INADEQUATE TO ADDRESS IT 
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in limiting the defense cross-
examination of [Jason Grant] regarding his favorable treatment by the State and the terms 
of his child abuse plea in abeyance agreement." Aplt. Br. at 22 (capitalization omitted). 
Because the record is inadequate to review defendant's unpreserved claim, this Court 
cannot reach it. 
A. Proceedings below. 
On direct examination, Jason Grant admitted that he had been convicted of child 
abuse "almost seven years ago" (Trl: 181). The conviction arose out of an incident in 
which Jason broke his son's leg while changing his diaper (Trl: 182-83). Jason did not 
intend to hurt his son, but had become frustrated when his son started kicking during the 
diaper change (Trl: 183). As part of his probation, Jason took parenting, anger 
management, and drug and alcohol classes (Id). 
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On cross-examination, defense counsel revisited Jason's conviction (Trl: 193-94). 
After confirming that the conviction occurred several years ago, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Defco: And you've had these classes since then and so you've gotten beyond 
that[?] 
Jason: I don't know what you call beyond that. There wasn't—I mean, I 
needed some parenting classes but (inaudible). 
Defco: Aren't you now presently facing charges for the same kind of a 
crime? 
Jason: Not even close. 
Defco: Okay. Child abuse or neglect? 
Jason: I flipped my oldest boy on the forehead because he was hitting his 
little cousin, my niece, Ryan's little girl. She was two years old— 
Prosecutor: Your Honor, I'm going to object to this. I don't think it has anything 
to do—it's not an adjudicated charge. It doesn't have anything to do 
with what's going on today. He's actually the victim. 
Court: Sustained. 
Defco: Could we approach, Judge? 
Court: Yes. 
(Trl: 194-95). At that point, an off-the-record side bar discussion occurred. Back on the 
record after the sidebar, defense counsel stated "That's all I have for this witness, Judge" 
(id). 
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If defense counsel objected to the trial court's ruling, he never placed that 
objection on the record. Nor did counsel place any evidence in the record indicating that, 
at the time of defendant's trial, Jason Grant had recently been charged with any crimes, 
let alone child abuse, or that Jason had received favorable treatment from the State on 
those charges. 
B. Defendant's unpreserved claim fails because she does not argue plain 
error on appeal. 
This Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved claim because she does not 
argue plain error on appeal. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claims.'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see 
also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346. This preservation rule "applies to 
every claim . . . unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist 
or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, «J[ 11. If a defendant "does not argue 
that exceptional circumstances or plain error justifies review of the issue," this Court will 
"decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 
1995); see also State v. Tinder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Mead, 2001 UT 
58, 35, n.5, 27 P.3d 1115. 
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In this case, defendant placed no objection on the record when the trial court 
sustained the prosecutor's objection to her cross-examination of Jason (Trl:195). Thus, 
defendant's claim is unpreserved. As such, her claim may be considered on appeal only if 
she argues plain error or exceptional circumstances. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45; State 
v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 35, n.5; Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5. Defendant has not 
argued either of those doctrines here. See Aplt. Br. at 22-24. 
This Court, therefore, should not reach defendant's claim. 
C. Defendant's unpreserved claim fails because the record is inadequate 
to reach it. 
This Court cannot reach defendant's unpreserved claim because defendant has not 
provided an adequate record on appeal to review it. 
"Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review have the duty and 
responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate record." State v. Wetzel, 868 
P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, If 21, 136 P.3d 
1261; State v. Tucker, 2004 UT App 217,16 n.2, 96 P.3d 368. "Thus, the appellant has 
the burden of providing the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal to prove 
his allegations." Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah App. 1990). 
"[Speculative assignments of error not supported by the record do not constitute grounds 
for reversal." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, *{ 20, 56 P.3d 969 (citing State v. 
Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128, 47 P.3d 111). 
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Here, defendant has provided no record on appeal to support her contention that, at 
the time of trial, Jason Grant had recently been charged with any crimes, let alone child 
abuse, or that Jason had received favorable treatment from the State on those charges. 
Thus, defendant has provided no record to support her claim that the trial court committed 
reversible error in restricting her cross-examination of Jason on those matters. 
Consequently, defendant's claim is purely speculative and must be rejected. See 
Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 20; Kirkwood, 2002 UT App 128. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 . Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has" knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 . Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
§ 7 6 - 2 - 4 0 5 . Force in defense of habitation 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is 
justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence 
to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence; 
or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the 
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is 
presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted 
reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or 
attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surrepti-
tiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11? 
You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening or using deadly force against 
another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of deadly unlawful force. 
Since self defense and defense of another have been raised as a defense, the Prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's shooting of the victim, was not in self 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening or using deadly force against 
another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of deadly unlawful force. 
Since self defense and defense of another have been raised as a defense, the Prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's shooting of the victim, was not in self 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening or using force against another 
when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes that such force if necessary to prevent 
or terminate another's unlawful entry into or attack upon his or her habitation; however, he or she 
is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if: 
a. the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or 
by stealth, and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose 
of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and 
he or she reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal 
violence; or 
b. he or she reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is necessary to prevent the commission of 
a felony. 
The person using force of deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed for the 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably, and had a reasonable fear of 
imminent peril of death or serious bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is 
made or attempted by use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by 
stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony. 
You may consider, but are not limited to the following factors in the above: 
1. Length of time between the entry and the shooting. 
2. The fact that the defendant left the cabin and chose to return. 
# 
INSTRUCTION NO. if 
You are instructed that the right to self defense ceases when the danger has passed or 
ceases to be imminent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. [Qf 
You are instructed that the reasonableness of a belief that a person is justified in using 
force that would cause death or serious bodily injury against another shall be determined from the 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
In determining whether the accused actions were reasonable from their standpoint, you 
may consider, but you are not limited to the following: 
1. The nature of the danger; 
2. The immediacy of the danger; 
3. The probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury; 
4. The other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
5. Any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship. 
